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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
RAYMOND SCOTT PECK, 
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v. 
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No. CV-2012-0964 
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner 
THE HONORABLE JEFF M. BRODIE, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
John A. Finney 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Susan K. Servick 
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REPLY ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
I. THERE IS ONLY ONE DRIVER'S LICENSE INVOLVED 
The Petitioner/Appellant Raymond Scott Peck is a resident of 
Bonner County, Idaho and on December 2, 2009 held an Idaho 
driver's license, which was a Class A COL. For the same reasons 
stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Wanner v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 150 Idaho 164, 168 (2011) Peck " ... has only one driver's 
license, a Class A COL." The Title 18 ALS suspension that Peck 
has served was a suspension of Peck's " ... driving privileges in 
toto, while the 49-335 suspension only applies to a particular 
subset of driving privileges, i.e., [the] right to operate a 
commercial vehicle." Wanner, 150 Idaho at 170. 
II. THE PENALTIES ALL FLOW FROM THE TRAFFIC STOP 
The Respondent's Brief is inaccurate in the assertion that 
"Generally, Idaho Code § 18-8002A prescribes the penalties 
governing all aspects of a motorist's driving privileges in the 
event that a motorist submits to, but fails evidentiary testing." 
P. 6. Both Idaho Code § 18-8002A and Idaho Code § 49-335 govern 
aspects of a motorists driving privileges when an evidentiary test 
is failed. 
The evidentiary testing itself is solely based upon the 
suspected criminal conduct. There is no basis for either the § 
18-8002A penalty or the § 49-335 penalty other than the suspected 
criminal conduct. Another way to look at it is that there is no 
independent basis from the suspected criminal conduct for 
obtaining the evidentiary testing results upon which Idaho Code § 
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49-335(2) is dependent. The constitutional protections afforded 
Peck apply to the evidentiary testing and are the basis for the 
requirement of implied consent. As set forth in the Appellant's 
Brief, implied consent requires that the tests be administered 
after constitutionally required information is provided to the 
driver, which is informed consent. 
III. THERE IS NO CHARGE OR ACTION UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
The Respondent asserts in the Respondent's Brief at page 7 
that Federal Regulation 49 C.F.R. 383.51 results in the 
disqualification of Petitioner Peck's COL. First, the Petitioner 
Peck was not charged with violating any Federal Regulation and the 
Respondent admits that the Federal Regulation actually only 
applies in determining whether a State qualifies for federal 
highway funding based upon the driving laws the State enacts. 
Second, when one reads the provision of 49 C.F.R. 383.51 relied 
upon, the regulation seeks to compel the State of Idaho to adopt 
legislation in the event of a conviction of driving under the 
influence. The regulation does not seek to compel the State of 
Idaho to adopt legislation in the event of taking and failing an 
evidentiary test. The State of Idaho, in adopting Idaho Code § 
49-335, went beyond the conviction provision in the Federal 
Regulation required for highway funding, and attempted to make the 
failing of an evidentiary test a grounds for a one year COL 
disqualification. In order for evidentiary testing to be used for 
the COL disqualification, the testing must meet constitution 
exception to the warrant requirement of "implied consent" as set 
forth in the Appellant's Brief. 
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The Federal Regulation cited and urged is irrelevant to the 
inquiry in this matter. Idaho Code § 49-335 is the only 
applicable provision regarding Peck and the COL disqualification 
sought by the State. 
IV. PRESUMING TO KNOW THE LAW DOES NOT DO AWAY WITH THE 
CONSTIUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
While the Appellant Peck is presumed to know the consequences 
of failing and taking an evidentiary test, the constitutional 
requirements for warrant still apply. If there is no warrant, 
there must be an exception to the warrant requirement which is 
met. The exception relied upon by the State of Idaho is implied 
consent. In order to have implied consent, one must be informed 
of the consequences (informed consent). The information must 
accurately notify the driver of the substantive consequences of 
the testing. Here it is undisputed that the legislative form used 
does not meet all the substantive consequences of the evidentiary 
testing. The form only informs of some of the consequences. 
While the form informs of the substance of the ALS suspension it 
does not inform of the substance of the COL disqualification. 
Therefore, there is no informed consent and therefore no implied 
consent necessary to impose the COL disqualification. 
If just the presumption of knowing the consequences of taking 
and failing an evidentiary test was constitutionally sufficient, 
there would be no need to inform a driver of the ALS suspension 
consequences to impose and uphold the ALS suspension (18-8002A). 
While the information given may have been sufficient to sustain 
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the ALS suspension (18-8002A), the infor.mation given to Peck was 
insufficient to sustain the CDL disqualification (49-335). 
The Wyoming authority cited by the District Court and the 
Respondent is clearly distinguishable. Apparently in Wyoming, 
implied consent has not been interpreted to require being informed 
of the consequences for the implied consent to be valid. In 
Idaho, the legislature's provision for informing the driver is 
based upon the Idaho cases which hold that the Constitutional 
provisions require such information be given to meet the 
warrantless search and seizure exception. The statutory 
infor.mation requirements must meet the constitutional mandates. 
When the legislature added the Idaho Code disqualification 
provisions, it did not amend its information requirement 
provisions. That lack of infor.mation is constitutionally 
defective. 
The Notice (which was created when there were only ~T.S 
suspension penalties) actually provided to Peck gave contrary 
statements and information to Peck compared to the CDL 
disqualification. The Idaho Supreme Court in Wanner, 150 Idaho at 
166, framed the issue as follows: 
The Notice did not address the situation presented by the 
underlying facts of this case: the consequences of refusing 
or failing evidentiary testing for the holder of a CDL who 
was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of 
contact with law enforcement. This is significant because 
I.C. § 49-335(2) provides that a motorist who fails 
evidentiary testing is disqualified from operating a 
commercial vehicle for not less than one year. 
For the ALS suspension to be upheld, Idaho law does require 
the driver be informed of all the ALS consequences. The Peck 
appellate decision on the ALS suspension only stands for the 
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proposition that the CDL disqualification consequences do not need 
to be given for the ALS suspension to be upheld. Here, the 
Appellant Peck asserts that for the CDL disqualification to be 
upheld, he (the driver) must have been informed of the CDL 
disqualification consequences. This is because the evidentiary 
testing is based upon implied consent. Without accurate and 
adequate notice, there is no implied consent. Without implied 
consent, the evidentiary testing cannot result in a license 
suspension or a license disqualification. 
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CONCLUSION 
As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, based upon either 
substantive due process or procedural due process (or both, 
although not required), the Title 49 Notice of Disqualification 
("CDL disqualification") served upon Peck must be vacated and set 
aside. Both the hearing officer's decision and the District 
Court's decision should be vacated as the notice of 
disqualification (a) violates statutory or constitutional 
provisions; (b) exceeds the agency's statutory authority; (c) is 
made upon unlawful procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record; and/or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or 
an abuse of discretion. 
The relief sought is to vacate and set aside the 
disqualification of Peck's COL driving privileges, to reinstate 
the driving privileges, and for an award to the Appellant of 
attorney fees and costs against the Respondent. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of September, 2013. 
INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Appellant PECK 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~~day of September, 2013, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, were served by 
deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were addressed to: 
Susan K. Servick 
SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
618 North 4th Street 
P.O. Box 2900 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
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